Category: politics

Proportionate punishments

As we discussed previously, punishment is an imposition contrary to the will of a guilty party by the one responsible for the common good, in response to or by reason of that party's guilt. The ultimate goal of punishment is to uphold good and restrain evil.

Consequently, there are several difference reference points by which the severity of a punishment is to be measured, and deemed as appropriate, or as excessive and unjust. "A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons" (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2, ad 9):

  • Since punishment is a response to guilt, it should be proportionate to guilt. "First, on account of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment." (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2, ad 9) "Just as punishment must be imposed on guilt so that the guilt may be ordered [the inequality of injustice equalled by punishment], so it is necessary that the severity of punishment correspond to the greatness of guilt " (St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Sent., dist. 20, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3)
  • But at the same time, since punishment is imposed not for its own sake, but to prevent evils ("The punishments of this present life are more medicinal than retributive, for retribution is reserved for the divine judgment." ST II-II, q. 66, a. 6), the punishment should be proportioned to preventing evils. A greater punishment may be required to hold men back from evils to which they are more readily inclined, or which it is harder to discover and so punish, or which readily leads to still greater evils.. "Second, on account of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Third, on account of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourth, on account of the facility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing them." (I-II, Q. 105, A. 2, ad 9)
  • But no more than is necessary for preventing evil: "The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, another is added: just as physicians employ several body medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices, another should not be employed." (ST II-II, q. 39, a. 4) "In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, insofar as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication." (ST II-II, q. 43, a. 7)

What punishment suits a given crime depends, therefore, on two quite distinct considerations: (1) how great the crime is; (2) how necessary for or effective a given punishment is in preventing such crimes, in instilling a revulsion for such crimes in the mind of the public, etc.

There isn't an absolute punishment that is "deserved" for a given crime, which could be stated in advance, apart from a concrete community, a cultural, legal and historical context, in which a legal system establishes and imposes diverse and just punishments for diverse crimes, according to their gravity and the necessity and difficulty of keeping people from committing them, etc.

As far as merit and demerit in the civil sense are concerned, for a person to "deserve" a certain reward or punishment, is nothing other than for it to be just for the law or keepers of the law to appoint that reward to someone for his benefit to the community or that punishment for one who harms the common good.

We can, therefore, only say that a given crime deserves a certain penalty, such as capital punishment, if it would be just for a community to impose that penalty. If it would be excessive and therefore inappropriate for the community to impose that penalty, it doesn't make sense to say that the criminal deserves that penalty, unless we mean something along the lines of "committing such and such a crime could, in some context, be justly punished by such a penalty".

Consequently, while agreeing with the ultimate thesis of Edward Feser's and Joseph Bessette's work "By man shall his blood be shed: a Catholic defense of capital punishment", I maintain that capital punishment cannot be said to be "deserved" for certain crimes purely in the abstract, as is suggested in that work, but only where such punishment fosters the reduction of those crimes or the abhorrence of them among the public. On the (in my opinion, and I think fairly obviously) counterfactual hypothesis that some corporal punishment and shaming such as public whippings, as the severest punishment imposed by law, were in fact enough to deter convicted criminals and any future potential criminals from aggravated murder, genocide, or whatever other crimes, and instill an abhorrence for such crimes in the general populace, than such corporal punishment would be what the "just deserts" for those crimes in that civil and cultural context, and a severer punishment such as capital punishment excessive and unjust.

Authority in Church history – blind obedience or personal judgment

We find two opposite approaches to obedience in Church history, one, that puts such value on obedience as to marginalize nearly every other consideration, another, that would measure every obedience by how well an authority corresponds to the truth or to authentic christian tradition – as judged by the one who was expected to obey.

The practice and teaching on obedience in the Catholic tradition has likely tended rather to excess in the way of blind obedience than to excess in the way of personal judgment. A tendency thereto is at any rate not surprising, given that the christian tradition, going back to Christ, e.g., “He who hears you, hears me” (Lk 10,16) and to St. Paul, has seen in the obedience owed to man, an obedience “to the Lord”, to God himself. (Eph 5: 21; Col 3:22-24)

Blind/unconditional obedience in the spiritual tradition

“8. Once a man who wanted to become a monk came to see Sisois of the Thebaid. The hermit asked him, ‘Have you any ties in the world?’ He said, ‘I have a son.’ He said to him, ‘Go and throw him in the river, and then you can be a monk.’ He went to throw his boy into the river, but the hermit sent a monk to stop him. He was already holding his son ready to throw him in, when the brother said, ‘Stop! What are you doing?’ He said, ‘The abba told me to throw him in.’ The brother said, ‘Now the abba says, do not throw him in.’ So he left his son, and came back to the hermit; and tested by such obedience he became a strong monk.” Sayings of the desert Fathers — https://erenow.net/common/the-desert-fathers/15.php

“That it might be more thoroughly tested whether he would make affection and love for his own flesh and blood of more account than obedience and Christian mortification (which all who renounce the world ought out of love to Christ to prefer), the child was on purpose neglected and dressed in rags instead of proper clothes… And further, he was exposed to blows and slaps from different people, which the father often saw inflicted without the slightest reason on his innocent child under his very eyes… And when the Superior of the Cœnobium saw his steadfastness of mind and immovable inflexibility, in order thoroughly to prove the constancy of his purpose, one day when he had seen the child crying, he pretended that he was annoyed with him and told the father to throw him into the river. Then he, as if this had been commanded him by the Lord, at once snatched up the child as quickly as possible, and carried him in his arms to the river's bank to throw him in. And straightway in the fervour of his faith and obedience this would have been carried out in act, had not some of the brethren been purposely set to watch the banks of the river very carefully, and when the child was thrown in, had somehow snatched him from the bed of the stream, and prevented the command, which was really fulfilled by the obedience and devotion of the father, from being consummated in act and result.”

And this man's faith and devotion was so acceptable to God that it was immediately approved by a divine testimony. For it was immediately revealed to the Superior that by this obedience of his he had copied the deed of the patriarch Abraham. (John Cassian, Institutes, Book IV, Ch. 27,28) https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/350704.htm

Blind/unconditional obedience in theology

First Rule. The first: All judgment laid aside, we ought to have our mind ready and prompt to obey, in all, the true Spouse of Christ our Lord, which is our holy Mother the Church Hierarchical.

Ninth Rule. Finally, to praise all precepts of the Church, keeping the mind prompt to find reasons in their defence and in no manner against them.

Tenth Rule. We ought to be more prompt to find good and praise as well the Constitutions and recommendations as the ways of our Superiors. Because, although some are not or have not been such, to speak against them, whether preaching in public or discoursing before the common people, would rather give rise to fault-finding and scandal than profit;

Thirteenth Rule. To be right in everything, we ought always to hold that the white which I see, is black, if the Hierarchical Church so decides it.

St. Ignatius, Spiritual Exercises (emphasis added), https://www.ccel.org/ccel/ignatius/exercises.xix.v.html

Ignatius here calls for more than external obedience to precepts of the Church and of superiors, but considers “thinking with the Church” to require one from abstaining from critical words or even thoughts against them.

And that, even when they are imprudent, as long as they do not command “manifest sin”.

3… The superior is not to be obeyed because he is highly prudent, very good, or qualified by any other gift of God our Lord, but rather because he holds his place and authority—as eternal Truth has said, “He who hears you hears me, and he who despises you despises me.” Nor, on the other hand, should he be any less obeyed in his capacity as superior if he is less prudent, for he represents the person of him who is infallible wisdom and who will make up for any shortcomings in his minister

… 7 … Whoever aims at making a complete and perfect oblation of himself must, in addition to his will, offer his understanding. … He must not only have the same will as the superior bur also be of the same mind as he, submitting his own judgment to the superior’s to the extent that a devoted will is able to influence the understanding.

8. For while the understanding does not enjoy the same freedom as the will and by nature gives its assent to whatever is presented to it as true, nevertheless, in many matters where the evidence of the known truth is not compelling, it can, by the will’s intervention, incline to one side rather than the other; and in such matters every truly obedient person should incline himself to think the same as his superior.

… 11. For if we look to the purpose of obedience, it is just as possible for our understanding to be mistaken about what is good as it is for our will. Hence, if we think it right to conform our will to the superior’s to prevent it from going wrong, we should also conform our understanding to his to keep it from going wrong. “Do not rely upon your own prudence,” says Scripture.

“Letter on Obedience” https://jesuitportal.bc.edu/research/documents/1553_ignatiusonobedience/

The only restriction on this absolute obedience in action, will and intellect is where “manifest sin is evident.” (Ibid, 24.)

While St. Ignatius, reacting to the protestant rejection of church authority, is particularly extreme, similarly citations from the christian tradition could be multiplied.

Personal judgment

The christian tradition knows also the maxim “an unjust law is no law.” (St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio i, 5 “A law which is not just does not seem to me to be a law.” “Lex mihi esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit.”

This principle, made famous in the 20th century by Martin Luther King, citing St. Augustine and Aquinas (https://www.csuchico.edu/iege/_assets/documents/susi-letter-from-birmingham-jail.pdf) provides a corrective to blind obedience. While a superior’s authority may be derived from God and from Christ, and so in obeying him one may be obeying Christ, the superior does not always truly represent God, and therefore need not always be obeyed, indeed in some case must not be obeyed.

But who may judge a law to be unjust or unreasonable? Some groups connected with the Franciscans, such as the Beghards, seem to have been convinced that the rule of Francis and poverty were so in accordance with the gospel, that any decree from the pope modifying or diminishing them would be unjust and therefore not binding.

They say that if the pope changes something in the rule of Saint Francis, adds something to it, or subtracts something from it (especially concerning the vow of poverty), or if he annuls the aforesaid rule, he acts against the gospel of Christ and neither a Friar Minor nor anyone else is required to obey him in the matter, however much he may command it or excommunicate those not obeying him, because such excommunication would be unjust and not binding. (Bernhard Gui, Inquisitor’s Manual: https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/bernardgui-inq.asp)

According to the moral theory of probabilism, it would seem, indeed, that whenever an individual is sincerely in doubt about whether a law or command is unreasonable or unjust, and, consequently, sincerely in doubt about whether that law or command is morally binding on him, he is morally free to obey or not to obey.

Joining the idea that unjust or unreasonable laws are not binding with the theory of probabilism that in the case of sincere doubt we are not bound, but free, we end up, in effect, with an altogether opposite approach than the blind obedience favored by many christian authors. Since an unjust law is not binding and might even be contrary to a higher law, one is not only permitted but may be obliged to consider whether a given law is just or unjust. And in the event of any serious doubt, one is not bound to follow the law.

The dilemma

Blind obedience may lead you to cover up sexual and moral abuse, to ride roughshod over the conscience of those deemed beyond reason, whether those are the “woke” or the “deplorables”, or to cooperate in a new holocaust.

The opposite extreme, refusing to grant legitimacy to whatever decision one holds is erroneous, whether a decision of church authority you reject because you hold it to be harmful to the Church, the election of the president – “not my president”, or a court decision, whether one such as Obergefell or Dobbs, if followed consistently, can spiral into schism, civil war, anarchy, or totalitarianism, the enforcement of the position of the strongest parties by brute force.

The mean of virtue

What are the alternatives?

Between “always obey”, and “obey only when the decision seems to you to be right”, there are a number of middle positions.

  • “Obey, unless you are sure (beyond doubt) that the law or command is wrong and seriously harmful”.
  • “Obey, unless you are sure (beyond doubt) that the law or command is wrong”.
  • “On matters of grave importance, obey, unless you are sure beyond doubt that the law or command is wrong; on matters of minor importance, if a law is merely probably harmful, it is not binding”
  • etc.

As is true of human and moral matters in general, it will not be possible to establish a definite golden mean that will be valid for all peoples and times, as virtue lies not in an absolute but in a relative mean. But we can try to establish a number of generally valid principles and guidelines to navigate in the murky conditions of a pluralistic civil and ecclesial society. In the next posts, I want to make an attempt at this, beginning with St. Thomas Aquinas’s account of authority and obedience.

Cancelling Public Masses, Natural and Political Justice

In the past weeks, ever more dioceses around the world have cancelled Masses either in conformity with civil law forbidding public gatherings, or on their own initative to help slow down the spread of the new corona virus SARS-CoV-2. Among not a few faithful churchgowers, this step has been hard to accept. Some have criticized it, on the grounds that, in the face of hardshpis, threats to man's physical health, and the like, the faithful need the sacraments and the public prayer of the Church MORE, not less, and that, in the past, when the Church was more conscious of its spiritual mission, this was its response to epidemics. This article by Msgr. Charles Pope, and this one by Fr. Jerry Pokorsky are fairly representative of the arguments made.

Some good responses have been made, such as Steve Skojec's or Rebecca Weiss's articles

Here I don't want to get into the details, but rather look more closely at the substance of the argument that cancelling public Masses can be reasonable and indeed obligatory, by reason of natural justice that prohibits risking the health of others without their consent except for a proportionate good in the same order. One might, legitimately, risk one's own health to some extent for the sake of spiritual goods (though even this can easily be excessive), one may not, except by way of just punishment, do bodily harm or induce grave risk of bodily harm to another merely for the sake of spiritual benefit.

The argument has two basic premises:

The minor premise: The gathering together of persons at Mass, even after taking the precautions that are in the power of church authorities (and even after taking the precautions that are in the power of each individual), poses a grave risk in the mid-term to the health and life of persons who have not chosen to accept this risk for the sake of spiritual benefit.
It is NOT merely a matter of the risk posed to those attending Mass; if that were to be the case, it might well be enough, at least in some cases, to ensure that those attending Mass are informed of the risk they are taking. The risk is that, as COVID-19 is infectious even before the onset of symptoms, one or more persons could be infected with COVID-19, quite possibly even without having any symptoms yet, and infect others present at Mass, and that these others will in turn infect others NOT present at Mass.

Note: If a similar risk would be present whether or not gatherings at Mass occur, the risk could not properly be attributed to the celebration of public Masses. So, if no other steps were being taken to mitigate the spread of the virus and sickness, the Mass probably could not be considered a great additional risk. The greater that steps are taken in other contexts to minimize risk of infection, the greater significance will the risk involved in the celebration of public Mass have.

The major premise: To cause grave risk to the health of persons who have not consented to accept this risk, except for the sake of bodily health or countering a greater risk of bodily harm, is contrary to natural justice and the fifth commandment.

Therefore, given the stated circumstances, for persons to come together for Mass is contrary to natural justice.

In some cases, such as in Italy or Germany, public Masses have been forbidden by political authorities. At least abstractly, the political authority, rather than the Church, is the competent authority to determine what means are required in relation to the end of bodily health of its citizens, and in this sense, given that the law is fair, not imposing an undue burden on one group as a means to the end (for example, prohibiting Masses but allowing sport events), the State does have competence to make such statutes. Of course if the state were to abuse its authority by imposing manifestly unreasonable statutes, neither the Church nor individuals would be bound to obey them. But given that the laws or statutes are in themselves reasonable or plausibly so, the Church does right, as a rule, follow them.

Approaches to the Coronavirus – a Radical Idea

Would you be willing to get sick for a few weeks and risk an approximately 1 in 700 chance of dying, in order to safeguard the lives of elderly and immune-compromised persons, and to return to normality in a month or two, rather than have everything shut down for potentially many months?

Here I want to put out exactly this idea. On the one hand, as a serious suggestion, though I don't think it likely to be taken up on a wide-scale. On a small community scale, I wouldn't be surprised if somewhere some few family groups actually take the proposed step. On the other hand, as food for thought for those unhappy with the measures currently being taken: what is the real alternative, if we don't want to have a pandemic comparable to that of the Spanish flu or the plague?

In attempts to contain or slow down the spread of the new corona virus SARS-CoV-2, governments have been taking fairly strong measures over the past months. Italy has been in varying degrees of lock down for some time. Beginning Monday in Austria, there are to be no public events, including no public Masses, classes in schools will stop beginning Monday or Wednesday depending on the school level (for the upper levels learning is expected to contain with electronic contact with teachers), employers are being encouraged to allow employees to work from home as far as that is possible, etc., to reduce social contact as far as possible, etc.

At least until recently, not a few persons argue that the current number of cases and deaths is still far below that of influenza, and so these measures are excessive.

The goal of these measures is, in most cases, not to stop the spread of the virus altogether or eliminate it, which is almost certainly no longer possible (unless a self-test for the virus that gave immediate results could be mass produced and distributed to all households or something), but to slow it down, to keep hospitals and other medical support systems from being overloaded, so that the mortality rate among those who WILL get sick can be kept as low as possible, and to gain time to test treatments against the sickness COVID-19 and perhaps to develop a vaccine.

In many countries people have been stocking up on non-perishable goods (beans, rice, pasta, toilet paper), though no real shortage of these on the production side is to be expected, and in most cases, even in the event of a quarantine, family or friends would be able to take care of purchasing what was needed. In some respects solidarity in countering the virus has been increasing, but the stocking up or hoarding there still seems to be a bit of the attitude of "every man for himself".

Here I want to throw out a radical approach, somewhat akin to the approach Austria is taking, yet still more radical, requiring still greater solidarity and selflessness, but very possibly more effective in the long term. Basically, the idea is that young and healthy persons voluntarily expose themselves to the virus, then remain in strict quarantine until the risk of passing it on the others has passed.

If the reports are correct, the UK is inclined to resign itself to the fact that the virus will be stopped until a kind of herd immunity is reached, and measures are intended only to slow down the infections until that point is reached. Well, why not do it the other way other around, hurry up and get it over with? More rapidly reach herd immunity or resistance, while limiting it to those least affected and least likely to die of it?

The relative newness of the virus means that our data on its transmission, symptoms, treatment, etc. is quite limited.

The measures currently being taken, reducing social contact etc., are only effective for as long as those are in effect. On the other hand, it is highly likely, though not 100% certain, that those who have been infected and recovered, are not able or are unlikely to be reinfected, and so also unlikely to be carriers.

Now, the virus hits older persons much harder than young persons. Current statistics show no deaths for children under 10, a 0,2% death rate in those under 40 years of age who get sick, whereas a death rate rising from 3% to 15% in those 60 to 80+ years of age. And a higher death in those with preexisting conditions. So, finally, it is the elderly and those who preexisting health conditions that one is most concerned with protecting.

The worst case scenario with a uncontrolled spread of the virus would entail around 50-60% of the population getting infected within the next 6 months to 2 years. If 50% of those over 60 get sick, and these make up 15% of the population, that would mean the death of 1% of the population, probably more, given that intensive care could not be provided for all.

So, one possible approach, in the absence of a vaccine (and given that it could quite possibly be a year or more till a vaccine is widely available) to rapidly increasing herd resistance to the virus is to have all, or many of those who are relatively unlikely to die of the sickness (Healthy individuals under 40 with no preexisting conditions), and who are able to stay in strict quarantine for two weeks, to voluntarily expose themselves to the virus. Of course, some small percentage of these would in consequence die, so they would all have to be willing to undergo the risk of their own death for the sake of the common good. Let's say around 25% of the population is young enough, in good health, able to cease work for the next weeks (so probably not those in the medical profession). In terms of overall deaths, that might end up being around 0,05% of the population, much less than the worst case scenario and even less than some of the mid-case.

If such measures were to be taken without delay, there would still be medical facilities available to care for the small proportion of those voluntarily infected individuals who do wind up more seriously effected.

This step would, on the one hand, greater increase herd resistance to the virus, and therefore greatly slow down the spread of the virus. At the same time, since we would have many persons infected at a known point in time and be able to observe them, we would be able to more rapidly acquire knowledge about the virus, and be more quickly equipped to deal with it.

Such a radical step requires, of course, on the economical side, the ability for many working persons to voluntarily take off the next two weeks of work. In the USA this would probably require government intervention, and be politically nearly impossible.

With the social and political system in Austria such a step might be feasible, and, with the right presentation of the idea, might even be acceptable.

Of course, on the social level, the proposed step could be taken in various degrees: families with children under 10 able to stay at home for four weeks could let their children expose themselves to the virus and have their child remain in quarantine for that time, doing everything possible to avoid older children or the parents being infected — to mitigate even the small risk of death for the parents, while increasing the herd resistance. Or again, younger persons in the medical profession might seek immunity through voluntary infection at this time, to ensure that they are able to care for others in the event that many of their colleagues get sick involuntarily.

On the morality of such a step, it seems clear that, if deliberately infecting yourself were, in fact, determined to be the best means of protecting your family members (in particularly the elderly) or society as a whole from the virus, it would be a morally acceptable means. "Greater love has no one than this, that one lay down his life for his friends." (John 15:13) The same applies to risking one's life for others.

Disclaimer: the idea just occurred to me today, I haven't thought through all the implications; there are a lot of uncertainties, including the effectiveness of this step, as it is theoretically possible that those infected and recovered might, after a certain period of time, lose their immune response and be able to be reinfected. I am NOT encouraging any individuals to deliberately expose themselves to the virus, much less encouraging any states to deliberately have people infected.

Perceived Poverty and Keeping up with the Joneses

Some time ago a man in his early 60s came looking for a cash handout from the Church. As I generally do in such cases, I sat down to talk about his living and financial situation. According to the information he gave, he was receiving 900 euros a month from the state (about 1000 dollars — this is the minimum that austrian citizens and permanent residents who have lived at least five years in Austrian receive, in the event that have no substantial savings or higher income), of which he spent 200 euros a month on rent for a room in an apartment with a former colleague.

Other than half a pack of cigarettes a day (in his opinion his only vice), he claimed to need the rest of the money for food and drink. On further inquiry, several times a week he would buy coffee in a coffee shop, not as a way of meeting up with other people, but just because he liked coffee. And he would several times a year take trips that would cost several hundred euros, sometimes need to buy new clothing instead.

In his estimation, his income was enough, but just barely, so that when unexpected and unplanned expenses came, such as some medical expenses not covered by insurance, he needed more money. This did not, he said, commonly happen (and indeed the last time he had received money from the parish where I now am was something like a year ago).

As he claimed to have a background in business, I tried getting into detail how he could better manage his money, noting that, if he smoked just one cigarette less per day, bought coffee in a coffee shop one less time per week, or even better, bought a coffee pot and made his own, he could set aside the money, and have more than enough for such unexpected expenses.

He reacted rather indignantly to the suggestion, as well as to other suggestions to save him money, and to make a kind of a game out of it, e.g., to take delight in seeing out independent he could be, not to see it, e.g., as a deprivation to make coffee himself rather than pay someone to do it, but as an exercise of self-reliance.

I gathered that he had the feeling, that's just what normal people do, and he felt it unworthy of his dignity to expect such things from himself. Such a feeling is formed of course by the society in which one lives, hence the title of this post, "keeping up with the Joneses".

Poverty comes in many forms. In first world countries with a weaker social system, such as the USA, absolute poverty can be quite great.
In first world countries with a strong social system, pretty much everyone can live in luxury in comparison with life throughout most of human history. Poverty is then mostly either a matter of perspective: relative deprivation in comparison with those living in still greater luxury. Or is the result of poor management of one's life and material means. This doesn't necessarily imply a moral fault, but a lack of domestic virtue in the Aristotelian sense.

This and similar cases suggest that the provision of a bare financial minimum for all by a means such as a universal basic income and healthcare might do away with extreme poverty, but by a long shot wouldn't eliminate all perceived poverty.

Universal Basic Income and the Universal Destination of Goods

In an increasing number of countries the idea of a universal basic income is being discussed and is gaining momentum. In contrast to a minimal guaranteed income that is only given to those who have less than this amount in wages or other sources of income, the universal income is given to all citizens regardless of their wages or other income. 
Andrew Yang has proposed such a scheme with the name of freedom dividend. The proposal could also be described as a flat tax reduction of $12,000 with the possibly that the resulting tax would be negative. For some, this way of describing the proposal, as an income tax reduction, coupled with the possibility of negative tax, or a tax payment made by the government to the citizen, might make it seem more agreeable.
The name freedom dividend, on the other hand, suggests a partial common sharing of the fruits of the earth and the economy, regardless of direct ownership of an individual of the specific means of production. The catholic teaching of the universal destination of good gives a perspective to see this proposal as realizing a form of justice in relation to the common good.
The responsibility of seeing that the goods of the earth can be enjoyed by those that need them is as such the state or mankind's responsibility, not that of an individual employee or businessman on his own. But because, for the most part of human history and in most cases, it was necessary for most persons to work in order to ensure that through man's labor and use of technology together the fruits would be enough for all, this requirement of justice became closely linked to the justice between employer and employee, under the title "living wage".
For an employer to be required, for the sake of justice, to consider more the wealth or neediness of the employee than the value of the work the employee should do is a major impediment to efficient exchange and valuation of labor. Such a system consequently significantly increases the cost of labor without a corresponding increase in productivity of labor.

Arguably, for all employers across the board to contribute 10-20% of labor costs to a pool that would be distributed to all independently of the work they performed, while likely increasing the price of labor in comparison to the present price, would end up being a more efficient way to ensure that the fruits of the earth and fruits of labor benefit all men, for whom the earth was created.  

USA Presidental Election – Expected Outcomes of Votes

Many voters consider both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton to be extremely bad potential presidents, yet consider one to be far worse than the other, and so think they should vote for Trump, to help ensure that Clinton isn't elected, or conversely, vote for Clinton, to help ensure that Trump isn't elected.

This attitude, I believe, fails to take into sufficient consideration the effect a vote in 2016 will have on the candidates in 2020, 2024, etc. Since we can expect be a presidential election in the USA to occur in those years as well, in assessing a vote overall, we have to consider the influence a vote made now has on what kind of candidates we will likely have in 2020 and subsequent election years.

Basically, a vote for either of the two major parties' (bad) candidates increases the likelihood that one or both of those parties puts forth similar (similarly bad) candidates in 2020, 2024, etc. Such a vote is a "vote" for the "system", so to speak — it not merely supports a particular candidate, but supports one or both of those major parties in putting forth in the future the kind of candidates they have this year.

In more detail: Assuming the vote between Trump and Clinton is close: a vote given for either of these two candidates (rather than a third party candidate significantly better than either of them) is a strong support for having two similar candidates to the current ones in 2020 (and in 2024, and 2028). For, to the degree that the major parties get more votes, they have little motivation to change significantly.
Assuming that one candidate, e.g., Hillary wins by a large margin: a vote for that candidate (rather than a third party candidate or for the other major party candidate) is a slight opposition to having a republican candidate similar to Trump in the future, and a slight support to having a candidate similary to Hillary in the future.

By "support" for a future outcome I mean that an action in fact increases the probability of a given outcome, and by "opposition" to a future outcome I mean that an action in fact decreases the probability of that outcome.

So, the more likely your vote might be the deciding vote between Trump and Clinton, to that extent your vote is simultaneously a vote (i.e., supports) having two candidates similar to them in 2020 (and in 2024, and 2028, etc.)
The less likely that your vote is unlikely to be the deciding vote between Trump and Clinton, to that degree your vote for one of them is less likely to affect the future major party candidates in 2020. (In addition, one influence of your vote in this respect is good, the other bad.) Consequently, to that degree does the value of a vote for a third party in supporting major party candidates in 2020 different from the current ones, outweighs the positive value of a vote for one of the major candidates.

To sum up, whether or not the race between Trump and Clinton is close, a vote for either one of them rather than for a third party candidate who would be significantly better than either of them, has a much greater expected negative value due to its expected probable influence on the 2020 (and 2024, 2028) candidates, than the expected positive value in hindering the "worse evil" 2017-2020.

The rigorous game theoretical proof of this is left as an exercise to the reader.

Seal of Confession in Court – The Case in Louisiana

Recently the Supreme Court of Louisana made a decision pertinent to a civil lawsuit naming Rev. Jeff Bayhi and the Catholic Diocese of Baton Rouge as defendants. According to the official statement of the diocese, the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court "attacks the seal of confession and the attempt by the plaintiffs to have the court compel testimony from the priest, Fr. Bayhi, as to whether or not there were confessions and, if so, what the contents of any such confessions were." (sic)

While the original lawsuit filed is itself under seal, the course of events implied by the published statements are as follows:

1. On July 6, 2009 the parents of a minor child filed a lawsuit alleging that Bayhi, having heard their child's confession regarding her abuse by a church member, was negligent in advising the minor regarding the alleged abuse and failed his duty to report the abuse as a mandatory reporter in compliance with the Louisana's Children Code. It also held the diocese vicariously liable for the alleged misconduct of Bayhi and for failing to properly train him regarding mandatory reporting of sexual abuse of minors.

2. The defendants made a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from "mentioning, referencing and/or introducing evidence at trial of any confessions that may or may not have taken place" between plaintiffs' minor child and the priest, including testimony by the minor child herself about the confessions, on the grounds that nothing that was said in confession could lead to a mandatory duty to report; consequently, there could be no breach of the duty to report arising from anything said in confession, making any and all testimony regarding confessions, including testimony of the minor child, irrelevant to the alleged failure of duty to report.

3. This motion was denied by the court, on the grounds that the legal privilege of confidentiality in confession belongs to the one making a confession to a priest, and as such can be waived by this person. In addition, it noted an apparent inconsistency in the law, one provision of which states that clergy are excepted from being mandatory reporters for anything that is a confidential communication (603(15)(c)), and the mandating reporting "notwithstanding any claim of privileged communication." (609)

4. The decision was appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeal, which agreed with the defendants, and thus granted the motion in limine, excluding from trial all evidence regarding confessions between the minor child and the priest. Regarding the claimed inconsistency in the law, it noted that the mandatory reporting "notwithstanding any claim of privileged communication" could not be interpreted to apply to priests as mandatory reporters, since that would make the exemption for clergy meaningless. (In addition, the appeals court found a peremptory exception of no cause of action, effectually dismissing all of the claims against Jeff Bayhi and the Church, on the grounds that he was not a mandatory reporter, that even if he were, it would be a matter of criminal law enforcement, not a civil cause, and that, finally, no standard is established by which his advice to the child could be judged negligent.)

5. This decision was appealed to the Louisana Supreme Court, which reversed the appelate court's decision; (1) it reversed the motion to exclude all evidence regarding confessions on the grounds that the legal privilege of confidentiality in confession can be claimed by the one who made a a confession to a priest, or by the priest on behalf of this person. Since the privilege belongs to the penitent, if the penitent waives the privilege, the priest cannot invoke it to protect himself; (2) it reversed the appelate court's dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the question of an alleged mandatory duty to report is here a mixed question of law and fact; two questions of fact in particular it held to be open: (a) whether the communications between the child and the priest were confessions per se, and (b) whether the priest obtained knowledge outside the confessional that would trigger his duty to report.

Some remarks:

Neither the appelate court's decision nor the supreme court's decision directly implies or supports the trial court's right to "compel testimony from the priest, Fr. Bayhi, as to whether or not there were confessions and, if so, what the contents of any such confessions were." The claim by the diocese the the plaintiffs attempted to have the court compel this testimony may or may not be true, but is not implied in the statements made by the appelate court and the supreme court, which deal only with the question of whether all evidence about the confessions, including the testimony of the child, may be excluded from the case.

The question of whether there were confessions

Granting that the court were to hold the content of confession relevant, and that the legal privilege of confidentiality of the confession cannot be invoked by the priest, having been waived by the penitent, so that her testimony regarding the confession could be introduced as evidence in court, it remains a separate question whether the priest could be compelled to testify about the confessions, despite appealing to the freedom of religion together with the Church's prohibition of speaking about the contents of an individual's confession.

The facts do not seem to indicate any real reason for doubt about whether the child's communications with the priest fall within the confidentiality of confession (apparently the talks were made just before the evening Mass, in the time and place for the Sacrament of Reconciliation, and the girl herself described what she was doing as going to "confession"); still, it does seem in principle to be within the court's right to inquire as to the criteria by which the communications are held to be confession, or more precisely, within the confessional forum. (Otherwise a priest could theoretically claim that everytime someone had spoken with him, whether about finances, plans for a celebration, or anything else, it fell under the rubric of confession.)

According to the official statement of the Diocese, "Pursuant to his oath to the Church, a priest is compelled never to break that seal. Neither is a priest allowed to admit that someone went to confession to him." As pertinent to the case, the second statement is false, and indeed, the defendants argued precisely that certain testimony must be excluded because it fell under the confidentiality of confession!

A priest may not say whether someone actually confessed sins to him. But a person has to say or do certain things in the external forum in order for the context of confession to be established; for example, he has to come into the confessional, to say "Can you hear my confession, father?", or by some other means indicate his intention to present himself and his conscience in the confessional forum. Since these things by definition take place prior to confession, and thus in the external forum (or in some cases, an internal forum such as that of spiritual direction), they do not as such fall under the sacramental seal, and a priest may testify as to whether someone did or did not enter into the forum of confession, though prudence and justice demand a general confidentiality about exactly what someone says that indicated his wish to make a confession.

Indeed, in many places and for a long time, penitents would in various cases receive a certificate testifying that they had been to confession. Till today couples in Poland have to present certificates of confession in order to get married!

The official diocesan statement further maintains: "for a civil court to inquire as to whether or not a factual situation establishes the Sacrament of Confession is a clear and unfettered violation of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States."

While there may be legal nuances of which I'm not aware, it seems rather that a civil court's purporting to determine what establishes the Sacrament of Confession, or any other sacred matter, would be a infringement of the state into the religious sphere, but that it's inquiring into what establishes the Sacrament of Confession, and indeed, for purposes of civil consequence and liability, making a judgment in a particular case on the basis of principles given by a respective religious authority, is no infringement, and falls within its competence. If the state is to protect various goods connected with the exercise of religion, it has to be able to make some judgment as to what things pertain to religion. For example, many states of laws against desecration of places of worship. Now let's suppose I'm upset about spray-paint vandalism of my back-yard shed. So I take it on myself to declare it a sacred chapel, to raise the stakes for vandals… if a civil or criminal case is then brought against a vandal, the court will need to ask whether it is truly to be considered a place of worship.

The question of knowledge gained outside of confession

Since according to the allegations and the deposition testimony, Fr. Bayhi met with the man accused of sexual abuse, Mr. Charlet, concerning the "obsessive number of emails and phone calls" between him and the girl, there does seem to be a question about whether he had grounds for suspicion outside of what he learned in confession that would have resulted in a mandatory duty to report suspected abuse.

The question of the right to waive the confidentiality of confession

The diocese statement claims: "Church law does not allow either the plaintiff (penitent) or anyone else to waive the seal of confession."

Now, the penitent is not bound to begin with by the seal of confession. In this case the Church did not seek to exclude the penitent's testimony about confession on the grounds that it was forbidden for her to disclose the contents of the confession, but on the grounds that the testimony was irrelevant to the case, as nothing that the priest knew from confession could result in a duty or imply a breach of duty to report suspected abuse.

The issue rather concerns whether the penitent can release the confessor from the seal of confession, so that he can reveal to another person the content of a confession. The issue is not a simple one; St. Thomas Aquinas seems to indicate that the penitent can do so in some way; while there has always been disagreement, the majority of moral theologians and canonists maintain the same; and canon law presupposes it — canon 1757 §3 (2) of the 1917 code excludes priests at ecclesiastical trials from "giving testimony pertaining to matters known to them through confession, even if they have been freed from the obligation of the seal", and canon 1550 § 2 (2) of 1983 code similarly prohibits testimony at ecclesiastical trials "as regards everything which has become known to them by reason of sacramental confession, even if the penitent requests their manifestation". Due to its complexity, I'll take up the issue in a separate post.

The Fallacy of Incommensurability II – Gun Control

In the past months there has been a lot of talk about various gun control measures. And a lot of the argumentation has presupposed the fallacy of incommensurability I mentioned in the previous post.

The idea that one has to do everything possible in order to save even one innocent life naturally leads people to the conclusion that, if the gun control measures X, Y, and Z will save even one person from being murdered, one has to take those measures.

Now, some of those measures can also be expected to result in the death of innocent persons who are killed because they, or someone around them, did not have a gun as a result of legislation or other pressures imposed by government or media. We may suppose, though, that at least some measures can be taken that will per year save more lives than those lost as a result of the same measures.

But what about the possibility that personal ownership of guns is a safeguard against a possible tyrannical government? Should that be a significant consideration in deliberation about gun control laws? Or is it ridiculous, as some have claimed, to avoid taking current measures helpful to save lives in order to safeguard ourselves from some imaginary future scenario of a tyrannical government?

I'll run through the numbers, but before I do that, let me state the summary result for those less interested in the numbers behind it. Basically, when one works out the various risks involved, one comes to the conclusion that a rational legislator considering any significant gun-control laws, is obliged to consider the risk of an increased probability of tyranny, and to take that risk into account in considering those laws.

Let's look at the numbers. Looking history, it is a pretty conservative estimate to say that there is a 2% chance that the government of the USA will within the next 100 years have become a tyrannical power that has murdered at least 5% of the civilian population (15,000,000 persons) due to personal characteristics (race, beliefs, infirmity, etc.) or in order to maintain its own power. Note that by this 2% chance I do not mean there is a 2% chance of tyranny if the country keeps going in such and such a direction, but that the chance is this high all things considered.

Statistically this risk of murder by a future tyrannical government is equivalent to the certain murder of 300,000 persons in that same 100 years, or 3000 persons per year. There would of course be a great deal of harm done to the other 95% of the population being a part of or living under tyranny, which would increase the evil of tyranny and the importance of considering the possibility of a future tyrannical government, but let's set that aside.

Now suppose a set of gun control laws increases the mentioned risk of murderous tyranny by a small amount, but enough that the increased risk is perceivable and plausible, say 5% (for a total of 2.1%). That additional risk is the equivalent of an expected 150 persons per year murdered.

So, if it is even plausible that a set of gun-control laws will increase the risk of an eventual tyranny by even a very small amount, those gun-control laws would need to have an expected outcome of at least 150 lives saved from murder per year. And there is, indeed based on historical evidence a good deal of plausibility, indeed probability for the opinion that the enaction of serious gun-control increases the chance of tyranny.

Consequently, the argument of gun-control opponents that the second amendment and the possession of guns is a safe-guard against tyranny is a significant argument, that a rational legislator is obliged to take seriously. It could only be set aside on the premise that there is no plausibility to the opinion that gun-control laws increase the chance of a future tyranny, or that it is just as probable that gun-control laws decrease the chance of a future tyranny.

Note that I make no claim to evaluate here the prudence of any particular legislation on guns, only a kind of meta-claim about what is necessary in order to establish the prudence of such legislation.

The Fallacy of Incommensurability

"if there’s even one life that can be saved, then we’ve got an obligation to try."

"If there's anything we can do to save even one life… we should do that."

"One life lost on the job is one too many."

"If even one innocent person would be convicted, that's too many."

Frequently in speech about policies pertinent to human life and safety, one hears absolute claims such as the above. The true principle that "one may not do evil that good may come," is transformed into the seemingly plausible, but false principle "one must do everything possible to prevent such-and-such evil [e.g., innocent human death]". The plausibility of this principle derives from the fact that human life is, in a sense, of infinite value, so it seems that the loss of innocent human life can never be weighed up and considered as an altogether acceptable risk.

President Obama has on several occasions invoked such a principle to justify his positions. He even gives the impression that he actually believes the principle is valid, which would be a strong indication that he is quite incompetent to lead any community, let alone a country.

It is hard to know how genuinely any politician holds such a principle, since it seems to have settled so deeply into popular consciousness that it may be difficult for a politician to truthfully and rationally justify such decisions without risking being widely regarded as inhuman and inconsiderate. Imagine a politician publicly stating something like the following:

"This health-care legislation could be expected to save 1000 lives per year, but it would cost 12 billion dollars per year, and would a burden for doctors and other medical professionals; it's not worth it."

In actual fact, it is quite impossible to apply this principle consistently in practice, and attempting to do so leads to many contradictions. In almost every case, one of the things one could do to prevent certain bad things from happening would be to refrain from certain actions one is purportedly obliged to do in order to hinder other bad things.

Imagine, for example, that a city is deliberating whether to build a bridge over a large river. As the situation stands at present, 10,000 persons are driving daily on average 40 miles to work and back; with the new bridge, they would only need to drive an average of 20 miles. The construction of the bridge is expected to cost 20,000,000 dollars, and is estimated to have an 85% chance of involving at least one fatality for a construction work, and probably several.

Given that at least one death is expected in the construction of the bridge, it seems the city must forbid its construction. On the other hand, by constructing the bridge, 100,000,000 miles less would need to be driven per year, which over just ten years would save 15 lives. So, according to the principle that if something can be done to save even one life, one is obliged to do it, the city must build the bridge.

What will someone do who pretends or thinks that he abides by this principle of incommensurability? Who thinks that, because human life has a kind of infinite value, one can never consider an expected loss of human life to be an acceptable consequence of some policy? Faced by such a dilemma, he will either choose randomly, or in accordance with personal or basic human prejudices.  Most frequently, he will be inclined to over-rate probable and proximate events, and under-rate large but improbable and remote events. In the case of the bridge construction, he will likely underrate the importance of the deaths in traffic accidents that would be avoided by building the bridge, and overrate the importance of the deaths involved in the construction of the bridge.